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DEDICATION 
 
 
Ad Robertum, magistrum meum. 
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‘Qui strepitus circa comitum! Quantum instar in ipso! 
Sed nox atra caput tristi circumvolat umbra.’ 
-Virgil, Aeneid 6.865-6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mundus est universitas rerum, in quo omnia sunt et extra quem nihil, qui graece dicitur κόσμος. 
-Lucius Ampelius, Liber Memorialis 1.1 (third century CE?) 
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That as the greater world is called Cosmus, from the beauty thereof the inequality of the Centre 
thereof contributing much to the beauty and delightsomenesse of it: so in this Map or little world of 
beauty in the face, the inequality affords the prospect and delight. 
- John Bulwer, Anthropometamorphosis: man transform’d (1653: 242) 
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INTRODUCTION 
Phillip Sidney Horky 
 
1. PREFACE 
 
 Self-reflection excites questions about our relationship to the world in which we live: 
is that world a priori ordered, or a chaos well arranged, or simply an indiscriminate chaos? If 
there is an observed order, is that order merely observed, or is it an image that obscures a 
more fundamental order, or even a disorder? If we do accept that there is a concept of ‘order’ 
at play, what is that order made up of? Does it have constituents, or perhaps properties that 
are unique to it? Assuming that we exist in some ordered world that we can describe, how do 
we set out to define it? Where, and how, do we draw its boundaries, either conceptual or 
physical? Is the ordered world one, or many? If many, are there ordered worlds within an 
ordered world, or even ordered worlds, or are there separately existing ordered worlds? Does 
this order repeat? If so, what unifies it in such a way that it can be observed as persisting? Are 
we human beings ‘ordered’ in a way similar to the world around us? And if there is order at 
various levels of reality (psychological, social, natural), what is ultimately responsible for 
such an order? 
 These are not novel questions: they are just as relevant today as they were in the 
ancient world, from the Delphic Oracle’s enigmatic injunction to know and explain oneself, 
to St. Augustine’s search for human meaning within the world of change.1 Modern scholars 
who work on ‘systems theory’ and ‘systems philosophy’ ask similar questions to these in the 
pursuit of a holistic understanding of the many parts of a ‘system’ and the ways in which they 
                                                          
1 For Augustine’s response to Platonic, Aristotelian, and Plotinian cosmology, see Nightingale 2010: Chapter 2. 
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come to relate to one another.2 According to Alexander Laszlo and Stanley Krippner, a 
‘system’ is most generally understood to be a ‘complex of interacting components together 
with the relationships among them that permit the identification of a boundary-maintaining 
entity or process’.3 For some scholars working in this idiom, such ‘systems’ can be proper to 
individual disciplines and areas of scientific enquiry, whereas a sort of ‘suprasystem’ is 
assumed to obtain over and above particular disciplines: the investigation of this 
‘suprasystem’ is the project of formulating a ‘general system theory’, following the 
terminology of biologist and philosopher Ludwig von Bertalanffy.4 So, while individual 
scientific pursuits might have special laws that we enquire after in the hunt for knowledge, 
and that condition the knowability of those sciences, there is a kind of isomorphism that 
obtains across the laws that govern particular sciences, which indicates the possibility of a 
universal system under which particular systems of knowledge fall.5 For committed systems 
theorists, it is possible to discover, or at least to approximate, a general theory of systems 
                                                          
2 See, e.g., Capra and Luisi 2014, Rosen 1991, Laszlo 1972, and Bertalanffy 1968.  
3 Laszlo and Krippner 1998. 
4 See Von Bertalanffy (1968: xxi): ‘[T]here is systems philosophy, i.e. a reorientation of thought and world view 
ensuing from the introduction of “system”  as a new scientific paradigm (in contrast to the analytic, mechanistic, 
one-way causal paradigm of classical science). As every scientific theory of broader scope, general system 
theory has its “metascientific” or philosophical aspects.’  
5 Consider Wittgenstein’s discussion of systems and their relationship to knowledge in On Certainty (§105): ‘All 
testing, all confirmation and disconfirmation of a hypothesis takes place already within a system. And this 
system is not a more or less arbitrary and doubtful point of departure for all our arguments: no, it belongs to the 
essence of what we call an argument. The system is not so much the point of departure, as the element in which 
arguments have their life’ (tr. by Paul and Anscombe). 
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which applies to all sciences, but most notably those that deal with the sphere of human 
action and experience.6   
 Recently, scholars seeking to find an ancient imprimatur for their notion of ‘general 
system theory’ turned to the ancient world, and in particular to Presocratic and Classical 
philosophy in Ancient Greece.7 In particular, they noticed that a special concept that helped 
the Ancient Greeks to explain the many innerworkings of various spheres of life was 
established sometime in the mid- to late-sixth century BCE: kosmos (κόσμος). Kosmos was a 
term common from Homer a few centuries prior, where it was applied interestingly to the 
good arrangements of soldiers as well as to well-spoken words;8 and it was also employed in 
political discourse from the Archaic period forward, to refer to administrators whose 
responsibilities must have included keeping some sort of order in the city-state it had taken 
on new meanings that went far beyond, and perhaps in contradistinction to, Homer’s usage.9 
Still, the early usages hardly implied a ‘general system’, in the sense of the meta-system 
whose laws apply to diverse systems subordinate to it. Around the time that democracy was 
                                                          
6 See, e.g., Rosen’s description of the relationship between ‘formal’ and ‘natural’ systems (1991: 44): ‘…the 
extraction of a formalism from a natural language has many of the properties of extracting a system from the 
ambience. Therefore, I shall henceforth refer to a formalism as a formal system; to distinguish formal systems 
from systems in the ambience or external world, I shall call the latter natural systems. The entire scientific 
enterprise, as I shall argue, is an attempt to capture natural systems within formal ones, or alternatively, to 
embody formal systems with external referents in such a way as to describe natural ones. That, indeed, is what is 
meant by a theory.’ Italics original. 
7 See Capra and Luisi 2014: 1-6 and Rosen 1991: 5, where Pythagoras is credited with establishing the dualism 
between idealism and materialism, the basis for his own distinction between formal and natural systems.   
8 For the significance of kosmos to Homeric poetics, see Elmer 2013: 49-55. Consider the challenges offered by 
Parmenides to the Homeric notion of kosmos, discussed in the chapters by Macé and Schofield. 
9 On which, see the contribution of Atack in this volume. 
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born in Athens, the kings expelled from Rome, and the Persian Empire established as a major 
world power, in the late sixth century BCE, something had changed, and kosmos took on a 
significance beyond its traditional deployment in Greek culture. Amazingly, over the next 
millennium – a period which saw dramatic growth and expansion in philosophy, science, 
music, literature, art, and performance across the Greco-Roman world – various figures 
involved in the production of human knowledge and art continued to investigate what sorts of 
‘order’ could be fruitfully explained by appeal to kosmos. Whatever kosmos was taken to 
mean at various points throughout antiquity – at some fundamental level, it indicated an order 
that is somehow arranged through forces of opposition, equilibrium, or measure – the word 
and its derivatives were employed in order to illustrate not only how the universe, in its 
myriad constituent parts, works, but also how it should work. That is, kosmos, as it was 
deployed by ancient thinkers for their understanding of the world that surrounded them 
functioned both descriptively and normatively to structure knowledge of reality.    
 This double aspect of kosmos, which, as the following chapters in this volume will 
aim to demonstrate, persists throughout its history in Greco-Roman antiquity, reflects a 
similar binarism that one sometimes finds in investigation into kosmos and its usages: 
descriptive approaches to kosmos tend to pursue a unified notion, an absolute kosmos, or, if 
we are to go one step further, the kosmos; this is a powerful idea that, so far as we can tell, 
received its most memorable illustration in the philosopher Plato of Athens’ (ca. 428/7–348/7 
BCE) masterpiece Timaeus, probably the most influential cosmological text in the ancient 
world.10 As Plato’s authoritative interlocutor Timaeus of Epizephyrian Locri, who delivers 
Plato’s most complete discussion of the universe and its nature, says:  
                                                          
10 The influence of Timaeus upon later philosophy and science is paramount: see, among others, Baltes 1976; 
Reydams-Schils 1999; the essays collected in Sharples and Sheppard 2003; and the essays collected in Mohr 
and Sattler 2010. Excellent recent comprehensive studies of the Timaeus itself include Johansen 2004 and 
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‘The entire heaven – whether kosmos, or indeed any other name that it would be 
most convenient to call it by, let it be called so by us – we must make an 
investigation concerning it, the sort of investigation that, it is granted, should be 
undertaken concerning everything at first, whether it has always existed, having 
no origin of generation, or whether it was generated, having originated from a 
certain beginning. It was generated.’ 
 
(Plato, Timaeus 28b2-7) 
Hence, Plato’s character Timaeus understands that the fundamental question we face in our 
investigation of the universe is whether it originated from a particular beginning, or has 
existed eternally. It was one of the most important questions in ancient philosophy. Within 
the dialogue, discussion of the kosmos leads to examinations of its many parts, and to the 
question of how its parts were brought together by the divine Demiurge and his ancillaries to 
form a complete living universe, subject to change over time, but nevertheless eternal after its 
initial generation. This discussion comes to inform Timaeus’ description of the biological 
generation of the human being, bridging the macro- with the microcosm, as Plato sought to 
provide a unified image of anthropo-cosmic generation.11   
 In the same light, consider the Roman statesman and philosopher Cicero’s (106–43 
BCE) marvellous Dream of Scipio, which, like the Myth of Er in Plato’s Republic, closed his 
dialogue of the same name. A young and ambitious Scipio Aemilianus gladly receives a 
vision of the universe, described by his grandfather Scipio Africanus, with the commitment to 
follow in his grandfather’s footsteps and gain glory in Rome. His adoptive grandfather 
                                                          
Broadie 2012. Timaeus will appear in references throughout this volume, but given the ubiquity of its 
importance, there is no single chapter devoted to this work. 
11 The macro- and microcosm relation is drawn explicitly at the end of the dialogue (Ti. 89a-90d). 
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responds by comparing the body (corpus) with the kosmos (here using the Roman term for 
the same concept, mundus):12 
‘Keep at it; and know this: it is not you that is mortal, but your body. You are not 
what your physical shape reveals, but each person is his mind, not the body that a 
finger can point at. Know then that you are a god, as surely as a god is someone 
who is alert, who feels, who remembers, who looks ahead, who rules and guides 
and moves the body of which he is in command just as the leading god does for 
the world (quam hunc mundum ille princeps deus). And just as the eternal god 
moves the world, which is partly mortal, (ut mundum ex quadam parte mortale 
ipse deus aeternus) so too does the eternal soul move the fragile body.’13 
 
(Cicero, On the Republic, 6.26) 
Scipio Africanus’ association of the animal body with the kosmos reveals Cicero’s Platonic 
inheritance, but it is notable that Cicero’s cosmology reveals a point of ambivalence among 
philosophers of the Post-Hellenistic period, namely whether the kosmos was mortal or 
immortal – he claims, rather vaguely, that it possesses a ‘certain mortal part’. Is this a way of 
accepting Plato’s claim that the universe was generated? Is it a differentiation of the cosmic 
body from the cosmic soul (or ‘World-Soul’)? Or is it perhaps referring to the World-Soul’s 
‘mortal’ parts, which are the spirited and appetitive aspects? Despite the ambivalence on this 
point, Scipio goes onto make claims that run counter to Plato’s position in the Timaeus, but 
reflect positions staked out elsewhere in his dialogues, such as in the Phaedrus:14 consider the 
                                                          
12 See the first epigram to this book, from the incipit of Lucius Ampelius’ Liber Memorialis (1.1): ‘Mundus est 
universitas rerum, in quo omnia sunt et extra quem nihil, qui graece dicitur κόσμος.’ 
13 Translation after Zetzel. 
14 Cicero here is translating into Latin Plato’s Phaedrus 245c-246a. 
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statement at On the Republic 6.28 that the soul is not generated (a claim expressly rejected by 
Timaeus at 34c). As soon as Plato has solidified the analogy between the generation of the 
kosmos and the human in the Timaeus, he initiates a messy, if persistently potent, debate that 
fuelled speculation for at least a millennium, in both the Greek and Roman worlds.15 
 At the other end of the historical spectrum in antiquity, the problem of relating the 
eternal and the generated natures of the kosmos is taken up by the Neoplatonist philosopher 
Proclus (ca. 411–485 CE). It prompts him to seek to explain how the universe could persist in 
its various fluctuations to and from Being: 
...before his entire journey begins, Plato appropriately makes definitions 
regarding these terms, when he names the universe ‘heaven’ (οὐρανός) and 
‘kosmos’ (κόσμος) and states of ‘the entire heaven’ – to ensure that you do not 
think that he is only speaking about the divine body – ‘let it be called ‘kosmos’ by 
us or any other name’ that it is ‘pleased to be called’ [Ti. 28b2-3]. It seems that he 
calls it ‘heaven’ on the grounds that it seems best to everyone, but ‘kosmos’ on 
the grounds that [it seems best] for himself, for he says of the heaven, ‘let it be 
called ‘kosmos’ by us’. It is appropriate to apply the name ‘kosmos’ because it is 
something crafted, even if it is also possible to call it by both [names], ‘heaven’ 
because it looks upon the things above (ὁρῶντα τὰ ἄνω) and contemplates the 
intelligible realm, and because it participates in the intellective essence; and 
‘kosmos’ because it is always filled and arranged (κοσμούμενον) apart from the 
beings that really exist; also ‘heaven’ as having reverted [to its source], ‘kosmos’ 
as proceeding [from that source], for it is from there that it is generated, and 
reverts back, to Being. 
                                                          
15 For the early history of the debate, see Reydams-Schils 1999: Chapter 1. 
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(Proclus, Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus 2, pp. 272.26-273.10 Diehl) 
Nearly nine centuries after Plato had laid the foundations for the debate concerning the 
kosmos and its nature, Proclus finds himself employing the philosophical and hermeneutic 
tools that had accumulated in the study of Plato – from his earliest exegetes and critics in the 
Academy, such as Xenocrates and Aristotle, to those who would ultimately codify his 
philosophical views in a new system, such as Plotinus. His account gives us a place where we 
might draw the line in late antiquity concerning the assessment of Platonic cosmology. 
Proclus’ lexical analysis of the term ‘kosmos’ builds from Plato’s account of the generation of 
the universe, but employs etymologization from the term’s function – the ‘entire heaven’ is 
called ‘kosmos’ due to its being arranged (κοσμούμενον) apart from true beings, e.g. the 
Forms or the Demiurge. There is, of course, only one kosmos, but it undergoes constant 
change despite its propensity for unity and existence.16 In this way, because the kosmos is the 
paradigm of what changes but retains its identity, it functions as a heuristic model for the 
individual, the person who persists in growing older while remaining the same. By 
understanding the universe in its manifold generation, I better understand myself as a 
potentially well-ordered being.17 
 Normative discussions of kosmos in Greco-Roman antiquity sometimes focus on the 
multiplicity of the term, how there can be many well-ordered things, or how many 
participants in the larger kosmos can be ‘arranged’ so as to be kosmioi: the stars, planets, and 
                                                          
16 Compare with his predecessor Plotinus’ presentation of the kosmos, discussed in Remes’ contribution. 
17 See especially the contributions of Brisson and Remes. 
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other meteorologica,18 city-states and their laws,19 land and buildings,20 speeches, poems, and 
other dramatic performances,21 social practices and habits,22 and the souls and bodies of 
individual human beings,23 and the basic elements of the universe.24 Others reject, or scorn, 
the centrality of the notion of kosmos to questions of nature or theology.25 Kosmos features 
quite a range of applications and goes far beyond the notion of the kosmos:26 the sophist 
Gorgias of Leontini, who flourished in the mid-fifth century BCE, contributes something 
quite remarkable to the history of the concept by assuming that a kosmos must be a kosmos of 
something; and that each kosmos of something is diverse, peculiar to that object. Or, put 
more philosophically, kosmos is fundamentally relative. The beauty of Gorgias’ sentiment 
lies in in the pithiness of its expression: 
The kosmos of a polis is manpower, of a body beauty, of a soul wisdom, of an 
action virtue, of a speech truth, and the opposites of these make for akosmia. 
 
(Gorgias, Encomium of Helen 1) 
                                                          
18 See Sauron’s, Gagné’s, and Shearin’s contributions to this volume. 
19 See the contributions of Atack and Brisson. 
20 These are discussed in the contributions of Brisson, Germany, and Sauron. 
21 See Macé’s, Germany’s, and Gagné’s contributions. 
22 See the contributions of Brisson and Boys-Stones. 
23 These topics are treated in the contributions of Brisson, Boys-Stones, and Remes. 
24 Discussed in Schofield’s and both of Horky’s contributions. 
25 See Johnson’s discussion of Aristotle and Horky’s discussion of early Christianity in this volume. 
26 In analysing the kosmos of law and rhetoric in Classical Athens, Wohl (2010: 2) helpfully identifies the 
possible divergences between ‘order’ and ‘adornment’, showing that a preference for the former is implicit in 
many accounts of early Greek law.   
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Gorgias excites the possibilities for understanding kosmos by grounding it in its many relative 
applications; but implicit is the assumption that kosmos itself is a meta-system with universal 
application across many areas of human experience, including warfare, aesthetics, ethics, and 
rhetoric. Indeed, Gorgias’ conceptualization, marked by differentiation of ‘order’ from 
‘disorder’ by contrariety, was influential in antiquity: not only does Plato mark a nuanced, if 
slippery, notion of kosmos in his dialogue concerned with challenging the dominance of 
rhetoric in his dialogue Gorgias.27 Plato’s student Aristotle (384–322 BCE) adapts Gorgias’ 
contradistinction between ‘kosmos’ (good arrangement) and ‘akosmia’ (chaotic arrangement) 
in a fragment from one of his lost dialogues (perhaps On Philosophy; see Fr. 17 Rose³), 
which is used to point to the notion that a single first principle is one over many other 
principles: 
The first principle is either one or many. If there is one, we have the object of our 
investigation. If there are many, either they are ordered or disordered. If, on the 
one hand, they are disordered, their products are more disordered [than they are], 
and the kosmos is not a kosmos but an akosmia, and this is the thing that is 
contrary to nature, whereas what is in accordance with nature does not exist. But 
if, on the other hand, they are ordered, they were either ordered by themselves, or 
by some external cause. But if they were ordered by themselves, they have 
something in common that conjoins them, and this is the first principle. 
Because this fragment was originally embedded in a dialogue, it is difficult to know whether 
it reflects Aristotle’s alleged Platonic metaphysical inclinations, or whether it represents a 
summary of a Platonic ‘one over many’ argument that he sought to criticize elsewhere, 
                                                          
27 As discussed by Horky in Chapter 1 and Boys-Stones in Chapter 5. 
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including his fragmentary treatise On Ideas.28 It is possible that it is meant to represent a 
‘Platonic’ view that would have been subject to dialectical challenge later on in the dialogue. 
Regardless, this passage supports the proposition that what is kosmos is, in some fundamental 
way, in accordance with nature; and what is its opposite is contrary to nature. In this way, the 
argument builds upon Gorgias’ seemingly trifle speculations concerning the fundamental – 
we might even venture to say axiomatic – divergence between what is kosmos, and what is 
akosmia.  
 One of the most remarkable aspects of kosmos in its usage throughout antiquity is its 
applicability at the macro- or micro-levels. As we emphasized before, the Greeks seem to 
have understood kosmos extensively, and to have applied it in the case of all kinds of ordered 
beings, at all levels, from the inestimable expanses of space and time, to the imperceptible 
principles and elements of existence.29 This appears to have obtained from early on in the life 
of the concept, and it is attested in two fragments of the Presocratic Heraclitus of Ephesus (fl. 
around 500 BCE) that concern themselves with kosmos: 
This kosmos, the same for all – neither did any god nor any human make it, but it 
eternally was, is, and will be: ever-living fire, being kindled in measures and 
being snuffed out in measures. 
 
(Heraclitus, DK 22 B 30) 
 
The most beautiful kosmos is a heap of sweepings at random. 
                                                          
28 The standard work on Aristotle’s criticisms of Plato’s ‘One over Many’ arguments is Fine 1993. See 
Johnson’s discussion of this fragment in the larger context of Aristotle’s criticisms of theories of the kosmos and 
kosmoi on p. XXX. 
29 See especially Schofield’s discussion in Chapter 3. 
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(Heraclitus, DK 22 B 124) 
Like Gorgias, Heraclitus conceives of multiple species of kosmos. But Heraclitus’ usage 
denies to kosmos what, in the writings of Aristotle and Plato, is a property genial to it: 
conceptual isomorphism in reference to the objects that take it on. In the first fragment, the 
kosmos under discussion, the one that is the ‘same for all’, is eternal but ungenerated, and 
subject to measure as it increases and decreases. One wonders, with Malcolm Schofield in his 
contribution to this book, whether Heraclitus is referring to the kosmos, i.e. the world, as 
Heraclitus’ ancient commentators took him to be doing30 – yet it would be difficult to account 
for the deictic ‘this’ (τόνδε) in that circumstance, and, if we compare with other fragments, 
the sun is revealed to be the most likely referent of the specific kosmos under discussion.31 
On the other hand, in the second fragment, the kosmos described as ‘most beautiful’ is but a 
heap of dust, collected at random.32  It is hence an ‘arrangement’ of any sort that obtains in 
natural conditions. With Heraclitus, we are quite far from the position of, say, the mid-fifth 
century BCE Pythagorean Philolaus of Croton, who anticipated later philosophers, physicists, 
and systems theorists in believing that ‘nature in the kosmos’, as well as the ‘whole kosmos 
and all things in it’, were ‘fitted together out of limiters and unlimiteds’ (DK 44 B 1). For 
Heraclitus, even though it can indeed be considered at the macro- or microcosmic level, the 
arrangement implied in kosmos is not always the same for all the objects to which it is 
applied. Nevertheless, we could still see family resemblance between Aristotle’s and 
Heraclitus’ notions of kosmos: both are revealed in nature, and what this shared 
                                                          
30 E.g. Clem. Al. Strom. 5.105. 
31 See Plato’s jocund criticisms of Heraclitus at R. 497e-498b along with DK 22 B 94 and P. Derv. Col. IV. For 
a good discussion of this issue, see Hülsz 2012.  
32 The consequences of this fragment will be discussed in Wohl’s Afterword. 
28 
 
conceptualization does is show how, throughout the ancient world, the peculiar way in which 
intellectuals formulated kosmos as a sort of good arrangement often has a knock-on effect on 
what they thought nature to be. And, indeed, one of the most important legacies of 
Presocratic philosophy was the identification of ‘nature’ as a fundamental object of scientific 
inquiry. 
 If Plato and Heraclitus are to be taken as roughly representative of two extreme points 
in the spectrum of meaning and usage for kosmos, we might further consider whether this 
notion is proprietary to Ancient Greece, or can be detected, with similar conceptual 
parameters, in other cultures of the ancient world. Of course, other ancient cultures had 
notions of an ordered universe.  The Romans called this the mundus, and they distinguished 
between various sorts of mundus that they could, in their religious practices, observe and 
contemplate.33 Some scholars have attempted to link these terms together through 
comparative linguistics, and although their arguments must remain tentative – nobody is 
actually sure exactly what the etymology of kosmos and related words is – there can be no 
doubt that the Roman and Greek notions are kindred.34 There may be some shared semantics 
with Hebrew texts as well: according to Genesis 2:1, on the sixth day, Yahweh created the 
heaven and the earth, and ׃ם ָָֽאָבְצ (ṣə·ḇā·’ām), a word that the Septuagint translates in the 
third/second centuries BCE into κόσμος, but whose semantics indicate the assembly or mass 
of an army (i.e. the ‘host’) – the translation represents a throwback to a usage found in 
Homer. Beyond the Greco-Roman and Jewish worlds, there are some interesting comparisons 
                                                          
33 See especially Germany’s contribution. 
34 Generally, see Puhvel 1976. Also see Alexander von Humboldt’s (1849: 52-3) eccentric summary of the 
etymologies of Greek κόσμος and Latin mundus, which he traced back to, respectively, Sanskrit sud, or ‘to 
purify’ (e.g. in Greek καθαρμός), and Sanskrit mand, or ‘to shine’. The Etymologicum Magnum (p. 532.12-13 
Sylburg) derives κόσμος from κάζω and καίνυμαι, or ‘I excel’. 
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with other cultures, but no strictly equivalent concepts: the Egyptians posited Maat as the 
moral ideal of order and righteousness, as did the Babylonians Kittu and Misharu35, and the 
Zoroastrians Aša.36 These conceptual ideals are perhaps closer to the notion of ‘justice’ or 
‘righteous order’ than to kosmos: they refer to cosmic order as essentially just, something that 
was likely emphasized by Anaximander, but we must remember that justice, in the sense of 
equilibrium, need not be an essential attribute of kosmos (consider Gorgias’ description 
above).37 Moreover, from the period in which kosmos, conceived of as good arrangement, 
becomes the kosmos, the links to mathematics, and especially to technical harmonics, are 
uniquely attested in the Greco-Roman traditions.38   Indeed, one might think that the concepts 
of Maat, Kittu, Misharu, and Aša are closer in meaning to early Greek Δίκη or θέμις.39 A 
complete comparison of notions of ‘order’ or ‘system’ in these cultures is beyond the scope 
of this volume, but it would surely lead to promising results in the history of thought.40 One 
might expect that it would highlight the strangeness of the Greek concept of kosmos in the 
relief of these other moral and existential ideals, which persist across ancient cultures 
regardless of linguistic family origin. 
 This book aims, among other things, to present thirteen diverse contributions to our 
understanding of kosmos as a formative concept that has had impressive effects upon Western 
                                                          
35 For a useful summary of Maat’s attributes and scholarship relating to this topic, see Karenga 2004: 5-11. 
36 For the latter as a cosmological principle, see Horky 2009: 55-60 and West 2010: 12-13.  
37 Anaximander DK 12 B 1.  See Burkert 2008: 68-9. 
38 See Horky’s contribution in Chapter 1. 
39 Burkert (2008: 69 n. 29) notes that Parmenides’ notion of the alternation of day and night is based on justice 
(DK 28 B 1.11-15); but this need not refer to kosmos itself, a term that Parmenides found problematic (see 
Schofield and Macé’s contributions in Chapters 2-3). 
40 An excellent recent collection of papers on comparative approaches to cosmology and cosmogony is Derron 
2015. 
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thinking. It is one of many core notions bequeathed by the Greco-Roman traditions to us 
today. Individual chapters vary in their treatment of this concept, ranging from historical-
philological assessments, philosophical investigations, analyses of literary expression, and 
evaluations of its practical application in ancient societies.  The scholars who have 
generously contributed their papers were encouraged to embrace the many possibilities 
afforded by kosmos and mundus, broadly from Homer in the eighth century BCE through 
Nonnus in the fourth/fifth centuries CE; each contribution is interdisciplinary, selecting as 
relevant the topics its pursues with a close attention to the ancient evidentiary bases available 
to us. The reader will encounter literary texts from the Greek and Roman canons, including 
poetry of various sorts (epic, lyric, and didactic/philosophical); prose texts (historical, 
philosophical, rhetorical, religious, and satirical); and dramatic texts (comedic and tragic). 
Several contributions will examine evidence from material culture, including inscriptions, 
architecture, and civic design. The reader will note a propensity in the contents of the volume 
towards philosophical texts that focus on cosmology: this is chiefly a consequence of the 
evidentiary base that conditions our understanding of kosmos in the ancient world, although 
the reader will also find manifestly non-philosophical expressions of kosmos. Indeed, what 
makes this a book about kosmos in the ancient world, and not simply about ancient 
cosmology, is this broader and more inclusive sense of the term.41 Contributors have been 
encouraged to consider the chapters of other authors in composing their own, and one effect 
of this has been the weaving of a web of thematic connections that persists across the book. 
Whether this network of ideas obtains its proper measure, as does Heraclitus’ sun, or assumes 
the character of a random whirl of stuffs, as Heraclitus’ heap of sweepings, it is hoped that by 
seeing the ancient kosmos in its many manifestations, the reader will be stimulated to further 
                                                          
41 Again, for cosmology, see especially the volume edited by Derron (2015). 
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engagement with the topic, and might even find some value in the contributions the ancient 
Greeks and Romans made to the universal study of ‘order’ – a study which has its most 
fundamental analogue in the study of ourselves. 
 
2. SUMMARY OF THE CONTENTS OF THE VOLUME 
 
 Cosmos in the Ancient World is structured progressively based on topical clusters: 
general notions of kosmos and their relations especially to cosmology (Horky’s first chapter, 
followed by those of Macé, Schofield, and Johnson); kosmos as applied to the individual (the 
contributions of Boys-Stones, Brisson, and Remes); kosmos and society (the chapters of 
Atack, Gagné, Germany, and Sauron); and kosmos and what lies beyond (Shearin, Horky’s 
second chapter). The volume is closed by an afterword by Victoria Wohl, with reflections 
upon its contributions and suggestions about how to take the concept of kosmos further. 
Attempts to bring chapters into dialogue with one another have led to their relative proximity, 
although the reader is encouraged to see thematic continuity across the volume as a whole. 
Generally, although the design is topical, contributions tend to progress diachronically, from 
the late sixth and early fifth centuries BCE to the second and third centuries CE under the 
Roman Empire – although the volume will range as far forward as the fifth century CE (e.g. 
in the contribution of Gagné) and it may circle back to Archaic Greece from time to time (e.g. 
in the chapters of Remes and Atack).  The reader may note implicit symmetries within the 
arrangement of contributions – this is a book on kosmos, after all. 
 The volume begins with the early history of the development of the term kosmos and 
related terms in early Greek philosophy, especially by reference to natural science, from the 
Presocratics to Plato and Aristotle. In Chapter 1: ‘When did Kosmos become the 
Kosmos?’, Phillip Sidney Horky asks the fundamental question: when did kosmos come to 
32 
 
mean ‘world-order’? Horky ventures a new answer by examining later evidence often 
underutilized or dismissed by scholars. Two late doxographical accounts in which Pythagoras 
is said to be first to call the heavens kosmos (in the anonymous Life of Pythagoras and the 
fragments of Favorinus) exhibit heurematographical tendencies that place their claims in a 
dialectic with the early Peripatetics about the first discoverers of the mathematical structure 
of the universe. Likewise, Xenophon and Plato refer to ‘wise men’ who nominate kosmos as 
the object of scientific inquiry into nature as a whole and the cosmic ‘communion’ (koinônia) 
between all living beings, respectively. Again, later testimonies help in identifying the 
anonymous ‘wise men’ by associating them with the Pythagoreans and, especially, 
Empedocles. As Horky argues, not only is Empedocles the earliest surviving source to use 
kosmos to refer to a harmonic ‘world-order’ and to illustrate cosmic ‘communities’ between 
oppositional pairs, but also his cosmology realizes the mutual correspondence of these 
aspects in the cycle of love and strife. Thus, if later figures posited Pythagoras as the first to 
refer to the universal ‘world-order’ as the kosmos, they did so because they believed 
Empedocles to have been a Pythagorean natural scientist, whose combined focus on 
cosmology and ethics exemplified a distinctively Pythagorean approach to philosophy.   
In Chapter 2, ‘Ordering the Universe in Speech: Kosmos and Diakosmos in 
Parmenides’ Poem’, Arnaud Macé seeks to advance beyond the traditional dilemma about 
Parmenides' cosmology that arises out of the fragmentary nature of our evidence. If 
Parmenides holds that any inquiry into physics is impossible, then how could a consistent 
cosmology even be found in the poem? As he suggests, its inconsistency would be the best 
proof of its being false. Recent scholarship, however, has sought to construct a consistent 
cosmology in the second part of the poem, usually referred to as the Doxa (‘Opinon’) and 
often concludes that there must therefore be some truth that can be obtained from it. Macé 
posits a third way, in which he constructs a nuanced theory of cosmic order in Parmenides' 
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Doxa, but also argues that there are clear signs that it is Parmenides himself who encourages 
us to reject the cosmic order as an illusion – a deceitful kosmos, as the Goddess puts it. Macé 
attempts to show that the study of Parmenides' use of the terms kosmos and diakosmos stages 
his critique of Homer, whose texts help the reader to reconstruct the missing steps of the 
Doxa. Parmenides transposes the Homeric vocabulary of dividing and ordering troops to the 
field of cosmology in order to illustrate how the words of men are hasty in their attempts to 
arrange a beautiful representation of the universe. The shaping and ordering of the universe 
is, for Parmenides, but an arrangement of words, assigned the power to construct a world in 
and of themselves that leads mortals astray.  
 Malcolm Schofield’s contribution in Chapter 3: ‘Diakosmêsis’, bridges the 
contributions to the study of Pythagoras, Empedocles, and Parmenides in Chapters 1-2 with 
subsequent chapters on Plato and Aristotle by examining the Atomists’ cosmic models. 
Schofield begins by noting that while deployment of the notion of kosmos has been much 
discussed in the scholarship on Presocratic philosophy, diakosmos and diakosmêsis have been 
almost entirely neglected. He argues that in describing the business of articulating ‘mortal 
belief’ as diakosmos, Parmenides bequeathed to his successors among the Presocratics a 
question – intended as deflationary – about the main agenda for physics and physical 
explanation: how is the universe arranged? As Schofield suggests, Parmenides is responsible 
for coining a concept designed to articulate it, an argument that extends the results of Macé’s 
contribution. According to Schofield, diakosmos was a concept Parmenides’ successors, 
especially the Atomists Democritus and Leucippus, were determined to reinforce, but only at 
the price of contestation between believers in a single world produced by design and 
proponents of infinite undesigned worlds. Finally, for Schofield, in Aristotle, diakosmêsis is 
reinvested with a hint of the deflationary.   
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 It is in Monte Ransome Johnson’s contribution in Chapter 4: ‘Aristotle on Kosmos 
and Kosmoi’ that we see the emergence of a wide-ranging criticism of the simple natural 
kosmos-theories advanced by Plato and his predecessors, as discussed by Horky, Macé, and 
Schofield. As Johnson argues, while the concept of kosmos was central to Aristotle’s 
predecessors and even his successors, it does not play the leading role in Aristotle’s physics 
that it does in (say) atomistic, Pythagorean, Platonic, or Stoic physics. Aristotle may be 
interpreted as a transitional figure in the development of cosmology, since, as Johnson 
argues, his natural science prioritizes other concepts over the notion of ‘order’, beginning 
with nature itself, the forms of natural bodies, and the causal factors of change and, 
specifically, motion. Despite the interpretation of some ancient commentators, the work On 
the Heaven does not have as its scope the entire kosmos; and the spurious work On the 
Kosmos, attributed to Aristotle, is the product of a Hellenistic Peripatetic trying to fill in an 
evident gap in Aristotle’s physics: no work explicitly dedicated to the topic of kosmos itself. 
In the fragments of Aristotle’s dialogue On Philosophy and the esoteric treatises, Aristotle 
primarily utilizes the concept of kosmos in the context of refuting his predecessors’ views 
about the generation (or creation, non-eternality) of the world, and about the plurality of 
worlds (kosmoi). For Aristotle, physical principles, which are explanatorily prior to 
cosmological ones, determine that the universe (to pan) and kosmos are identical; there can 
only be one kosmos and heaven (ouranos); and the singular kosmos cannot be generated or 
destroyed. Thus, his predecessors’ theories about how kosmoi are created (kosmopoieia) and 
ordered (diakosmêsis) are rendered moot, because they do not start off from the proper 
physical principles, which necessitate a single eternal spherical kosmos with only internal 
structure and order. Johnson’s chapter dovetails with Schofield’s in seeing Aristotle as 
presenting a deflationary view of diakosmêsis. Despite this, so Johnson argues, Aristotle 
actually makes use of something like a plurality of worlds view in his own meteorological 
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theory, which requires a strict demarcation of ‘the kosmos around the earth’ and ‘the kosmos 
around the upper motion’ (i.e. the heaven), worlds understood to consist of different kinds of 
matter and to operate according to different physical principles of motion. This can either be 
seen as evidence of an earlier stage in Aristotle’s regimentation of natural scientific concepts, 
or as an adaptation of his principles to the specialized field of meteorology. Hence, for 
Johnson, Aristotle’s employment of the concept of kosmos is primarily instrumental and 
epexegetical, and the evidence for his contributions to natural cosmology has been 
overemphasised by scholars, both ancient and modern.  
 The volume shifts from the broader discussion of the macrocosm of the universe to 
the microcosms of the city and the individual that are ‘well ordered’ (kosmios) with the 
chapter of George Boys-Stones. In Chapter 5: ‘Order and Orderliness: the Myth of the 
“Inner Beauty” in Plato’, Boys-Stones argues that Plato effectively pre-empts the Stoics in 
defining virtuous action as conformity with cosmic order. Boys-Stones notes first that 
scholarship has been beguiled by Alcibiades’ striking analysis of Socrates in the Symposium 
as someone ugly to look at but beautiful within, and misled into thinking that Plato defines 
virtue as ‘inner beauty’, something private which only accidentally manifests itself in public 
benefit. As he argues, as a closer examination of Diotima’s account of the lover’s ascent 
towards beauty in the same dialogue shows, the distinction that actually interests Plato is that 
between the body and its activity – not the body and the soul as such. And by referencing this 
activity to cosmic order (as he does most clearly in Gorgias 507e-508a, a passage discussed 
extensively by Horky in his first contribution), Plato guarantees essentially that virtue is not 
only publicly manifest, but of essential benefit to others as well as self – a sentiment that 
found expression in Plato’s Laws as well, as Brisson contends in the next chapter. Hence, as 
Boys-Stones argues, the manifestation of virtue in the person who is kosmios is of the utmost 
importance to Plato’s moral philosophy.  
36 
 
Chapter 6 sees Luc Brisson investigating the other main Platonic political text in 
which kosmos looms large: Laws. In ‘Polis as Kosmos in Plato’s Laws’, Brisson argues that 
the Laws are more than a legislative code, and more than a work of political philosophy. In 
effect, they call for the realization of a project toward which Plato's work converges, i.e. to 
account for the whole of reality: individual, city, and world. This discourse in which the law 
(nomos) consists derives its origin from the intellect, which represents what is most akin in 
the soul to the divine, because it is the principle of order (kosmos). This order, which is 
manifested in the celestial bodies, must be present in man's soul, in which the intellect has to 
rule over pleasures and pains. Thus, according to Brisson, an order will be assured by means 
of the law within the city, an order based on the contemplation of the regularity and 
permanence of the movements of the celestial bodies, which the citizens shall imitate, even in 
their movements around the territory. In the Laws, then, Plato brings the cosmology of the 
Presocratics, discussed extensively by Horky, Macé, and Schofield at the beginning of this 
volume, to its (natural) conclusion. The city, which is to bring about the birth of the whole of 
virtue in all the human beings who constitute it, is organized by means of a legislation that 
takes the functioning of the world as its model. The opposition between nomos and physis 
therefore disappears, because the law becomes the expression of nature. 
In Chapter 7: ‘Relating to the World, Encountering the Other: Plotinus on Cosmic 
and Human Action’, Pauliina Remes’s discussion of Plotinus’ cosmic moral psychology 
takes ancient philosophers’ endless fascination with Homer as a point of departure for his 
own philosophy of action. According to Remes, in Plotinian Neoplatonism the kosmos is the 
first ideal entity that human beings can emulate in their search for god-likeness. Unlike 
higher hypostases, the kosmos is an embodied god, involved in temporality; in it, the 
intelligible structures already present themselves as unfolded spatially (or materially) and in 
time. Its life or peculiar mode of existence is thereby closer to that of embodied human 
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existence than that of a pure, unembodied and eternal Intellect - not to speak of the altogether 
indivisible One beyond being. At the same time, the kosmos displays perfection, harmony and 
completeness. This kind of unified harmony and perfection are undeniably worthy of being 
ideals for human life and activity, and as such regulative of ideal selfhood. Remes’s chapter 
aims to contextualize human action within the cosmic ideal, but to also show, importantly, 
the limits as such an ideal. Human action is characterized already by Plato as a complex 
relation of affecting and being affected: of a limited thing meeting other things external to it, 
and either effecting a change in the thing encountered or suffering an affecting in this 
encounter. In an understudied passage (3.3.5.40-6), Plotinus offers a brief but telling glimpse 
at the challenges of human moral life. By using the example of the Trojan War, Plotinus 
outlines different scenarios, that is, different kind of encounters between virtuous and vicious 
people. Through unravelling the Homeric example and situating it in the above Platonic 
framework of affecting and being affected, so Remes concludes, the passage yields an 
interesting opening for a theory on practical action and morality by Plotinus.   
Plotinus’ profound reflections upon Homer encourage us to circle back to Archaic 
Greece, and to investigate the meanings of the civic theories and practices related to the 
Greek kosmos and its Roman counterpart, the mundus. Indeed, the subsequent chapters show 
how notions of order reverberated throughout the Greek and Roman political and domestic 
worlds, especially in reference to public and private civic performance. In Chapter 8: 
‘Tradition and Innovation in the Kosmos-Polis Analogy’, Carol Atack notes that the 
organization of human community somehow reflected the organization of the kosmos as a 
whole was commonplace in both Archaic and Classical Greek political thought and practice. 
But, as Atack argues, the diversity of both Greek political arrangements and interpretations of 
myths of cosmic origin and change complicate the analogy. The association between human 
and cosmic order in the archaic age is reflected in the political terminology of historical city-
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states, seen in the titles of officials from the kosmoi of Crete to the kosmopolis of 
Epizephyrian Locri. Aristotle, in noting the limited capacities of the Cretan kosmoi (Pol. 
2.10.1272b1-11), identifies the Cretan constitution as proto-political, suggesting that the 
‘kosmos-polis’ analogy identifies a primitive, hierarchical form of polis society. Similarly, the 
order of Zeus, as related in archaic cosmological texts such as Hesiod’s Theogony, seems to 
reflect stratified hierarchical societies in which individuals occupy fixed positions. In fifth-
century democratic Athens, however, dramatists explored the implications of cosmic political 
ordering in new ways: for example, Prometheus Bound inverts the kosmos-polis analogy by 
describing Zeus’ rule as tyranny (PV 324–57), whereas Aristophanes constructed an Athenian 
everyman whose destructive legal powers resemble those of the thunder god himself (Wasps 
619–30).  In the fourth century BCE, however, Plato reasserts the importance of a 
hierarchical cosmic order for politics, in describing ideal (and less-than-ideal) cities such as 
Atlantis (in the Critias) and Magnesia (in the Laws), but with his own cosmology from the 
Timaeus replacing the traditional versions.   
 In Chapter 9: ‘Cosmic Choruses: Metaphor and Performance’, Renaud Gagné 
pursues a chronologically wide-ranging study of how the motion of the heavenly bodies was 
conceptualized through the idea of choral dance. This chapter compares various unrelated, 
self-reflexive usages of the astral chorus metaphor in three genres of poetry, and briefly 
considers how the specificities of one illuminate the others. Instead of a teleological 
narrative, a dialogue of commonalities and contrasts is sought in the juxtaposition of 
comparable case studies; hence, Gagné’s approach reflects a more Heraclitean approach to 
the ordering of phenomena, as discussed above and in Victoria Wohl’s ‘Afterword’. For 
Gagné, each case of astral chorus solicited develops the contours of the series, and the series 
gives greater relief to the unique ‘texture’ of each case. This is significant thematically: the 
striking image of the astral chorus was, among many other things, a powerful catalyst for 
39 
 
reflecting upon mimesis in action. Indeed, a vision of the cosmic order is used in all three 
case texts to reflect on the boundaries of poetic representation. The first text is a short 
epigram from the Augustan poet Marcus Argentarius (Anth. Pal. 9.270 = G.-P. XXVI). The 
second passage is the long ecphrasis of Dionysus’ shield in the Dionysica of Nonnus of 
Panopolis (25.380-572), composed sometime around the fifth century CE. The third text is 
another shield ecphrasis, that one from the first stasimon of Euripides’ Electra (432-86), 
composed sometime around 420 BCE. The readings illustrate how a key figure of cosmic 
harmony was revisited time and again to ponder the limits of poetic representation. Projecting 
itself on the kosmos, the idea of the choral dance could also reflect the kosmos back on song 
itself. 
 In Chapter 10: ‘All the World’s a Stage: Contemplatio Mundi in Roman Theatre’, 
Robert Germany investigates the significance that Roman augural practice, as a kindred 
practice to Greek θεωρία/theôria, held for Roman comedy and tragedy. Central to his 
arguments are notions of time and space that ultimately show the broad importance of 
Aristotelian concepts, as investigated in Johnson’s chapter, to the broader Hellenistic world. 
Germany argues that augury-taking involved sitting in a terrestrial temple while gazing at a 
specially demarcated zone of sky or as it was sometimes called a ‘whole-world’ (mundus). 
This temporarily legible space in which the gods would direct the signifying flight of birds 
was more than a celestial backdrop; it was also itself a temple (templum caeli) and the 
technical term for this temple-gazing was contemplatio. As Germany argues, the institution of 
Roman theatre has not generally been associated with practices of auspication, but because of 
the emphatic insistence on the temporary stage, the conventional ‘Unity of Time’, and the 
probable placement of audience seating, there was a suggestive similarity between the Middle 
Republican audience’s spectation at tragedies and comedies and traditional augural 
contemplation. Most tellingly, so Germany suggests, Plautus plays up this homology, 
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fashioning his stage as a zone of auspication for the audience, while within the play-world the 
characters are caught trying to predict the future of their own fictional mundus. The structural 
echo between augural and theatrical contemplation outlives the Republican temporary stage 
in Seneca, where it has become a distinctively Roman mode of construing the intersection of 
the cosmic gaze and philosophical or spectatorial θεωρία/theôria.  
 The application of Greco-Roman notions of gazing upon the various worlds, both 
those of the heavens and those of the earth, to architectural design motivates Gilles Sauron’s 
contribution in Chapter 11: ‘The Architectural Representation of the Kosmos from 
Varro to Hadrian.’ Sauron expands upon insights in Gagné’s and Germany’s papers, while 
at the same time paying close attention to the cosmology of Plato as discussed in the 
contributions of Brisson and Atack, in his investigation of cosmic representation as one of the 
leading themes of Roman architectural decoration. As Sauron notes, while cosmic 
representation in the public sphere is generally well discussed in the scholarship (e.g. at the 
Pantheon in Rome), this phenomenon is not often examined in private spaces, despite the fact 
that it was of especial importance to Roman elites. His chapter addresses this topic by 
investigating evidence related to architecture attested in written texts and in archaeological 
monuments themselves which are associated with aristocratic houses or imperial palaces. 
Two examples of cosmic private representation, two centuries apart, are especially 
noteworthy for Sauron’s case: the aviary that Varro had built around 80 BCE inside his Villa 
at Casinum, and the Teatro Marittimo that the Emperor Hadrian erected in his Villa at Tivoli. 
Additionally, he considers possible cosmic structures in the arrangement of the cave at 
Sperlonga, which was part of Tiberius’ Praetorium, and the Cenatio Rotunda of Nero’s 
Domus Aurea, to which some recently discovered monuments on the Palatine Hill have been 
attributed. Finally, Sauron contextualizes his analysis of trends detected in these monuments 
with Pompeian frescos of the so-called Second Style, which illustrate the kosmos through 
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impressive allegories situated in fantastic architectural structures. In all these cases, the 
representations of the private sphere are arranged according to the particular point of view of 
the person who frequents the place; and the inspiration for these decorations and 
arrangements appears to have come from philosophers, especially Plato, and from Greek 
astronomers who fascinated the Roman elite, such as Aratus, whose Phaenomena was 
translated into Latin first by Cicero, and then by Germanicus.   
 The final papers in Cosmos in Ancient Philosophy return our gaze to the heavens and 
beyond, the seat of the origins of philosophical investigation. In Chapter 12: ‘The Deep-
Sticking Boundary Stone: Cosmology, Sublimity, and Knowledge in Lucretius De 
Rerum Natura and Seneca’s Naturales Quaestiones’, W.H. Shearin considers the issue of 
contemplating the heavenly orders as discussed by Johnson, Germany, and Sauron in their 
contributions – but through the distinctive eyes of an Epicurean or a Stoic. As Shearin notes, 
Atomists generally, and the Epicurean school specifically, offer an approach to cosmology 
that stands in stark contrast to the main lines of the earlier ancient philosophical tradition. 
Dismissing the divine mind as a structuring principle, Atomists instead explain the origins of 
the kosmos (and everything in it) from the bottom up, in contradistinction to Aristotle (as 
formulated by Johnson). Plant life, animal life, meteorological phenomena, and natural 
disasters are all at root products of the chance interaction of atoms and void. On the one hand, 
such an approach, defined as it is in opposition to earlier tradition, grants cosmological study 
less inherent importance. As Shearin notes, observing the kosmos cannot yield any more 
basic insight into the structure of the universe than studying motes in a sunbeam. On the other 
hand, there is abundant evidence for Epicurean science and more specifically for Epicurean 
attempts to explain meteorological phenomena. Yet this science, as Shearin’s chapter 
explores, is rooted first and foremost in Epicurean ethics and, for Lucretius, in the didactic 
aims of his poem. Its intent is not a deeper understanding of the world, but rather securing 
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calm and assuaging the anxieties of the troubled mind. More specifically, Shearin explores 
the intersection of Lucretius’ and Seneca’s natural scientific investigations with the sublime, 
a powerful sentiment that marks and models the viewer’s response to the kosmos. He 
contends that we find subtle differences in Lucretius’ and Seneca’s approaches to the 
sublime, differences that are rooted in larger philosophical disparities with regard to 
knowledge in Stoic and Epicurean science. The Stoic Seneca grants great value to knowledge 
per se, whereas the Epicurean Lucretius views knowledge as purely instrumental to the more 
important aim of psychic calm. In Seneca’s hands, then, the sublime is rooted in the human 
approach to divine omniscience, while for Lucretius, the sublime is a consequence (and 
reminder) of the stark limits of human knowledge. 
 Chapter 13, Phillip Sidney Horky’s ‘Cosmic Spiritualism among the 
Pythagoreans, Stoics, Jews, and Early Christians’, traces how the dualism of body and 
soul, cosmic and human, is bridged in philosophical and religious traditions through appeal to 
the notion of ‘breath’ (πνεῦμα). Horky pursues this project by way of a genealogy of 
pneumatic cosmology and anthropology, covering a wide range of sources, including the 
Pythagoreans of the fifth century BCE (in particular, Philolaus of Croton), the Stoics of the 
third and second centuries BCE (especially Posidonius), the Jews writing in Hellenistic 
Alexandria in the first century BCE (Philo), and the Christians of the first century CE (the 
gospel writers and Paul). Starting from the early Pythagoreans, ‘breath’ and ‘breathing’ 
function to draw analogies between cosmogony and anthropogony – a notion ultimately 
rejected by Plato in the Timaeus and Aristotle in his cosmological works, but taken up by the 
Posidonius (perhaps following the early Stoa) and expanded into a rich and challenging 
corporeal metaphysics. Similarly, the Post-Hellenistic philosopher and biblical exegete Philo 
of Alexandria, who was deeply influenced by both Platonist and Stoic physics, approaches 
the cosmogony and anthropogony described in Genesis (1:1-3 and 1:7) through Platonist-
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Stoic philosophy, in his attempt to provide a philosophically rigorous explanation for why 
Moses employed certain terms or phrases when writing his book of creation. Finally, the 
chapter sees a determined shift in the direction of rejecting pneumatic cosmology for a 
revised pneumatic anthropogony in the writings of the New Testament: by appeal to the 
‘Holy Spirit’ or ‘Holy Breath’ (πνεῦμα ἅγιον), early Christians effectively adapted the Stoic 
metaphysics of ‘breath’, with its notions of divine intelligence and bonding, to the prophetic 
and ecclesiastical project of building a Christian community conceived of as the ‘body of 
Christ’. Hence, according to Horky, the spiritual cosmogony of the Pythagoreans, Stoics, and 
Philo is effectively subordinated to the spiritual anthropogony that facilitates the construction 
of the Christian kosmopolis, only fully realized fully the form of New Jerusalem, the ‘bride’ 
which, in tandem with the Holy Spirit, calls to the anointed. At the end of the Christian 
world-view, the kosmos of Greek philosophy is supplanted by the pneumatic kosmopolis. 
 In the ‘Afterword’, Victoria Wohl synopsizes and synthesizes the contributions of 
the preceding papers. Approaching kosmos as a ‘distribution of the sensible’ (in Jacques 
Rancière’s phrase), she traces the way kosmos operates to organize reality on the level of 
aesthetics, politics, ethics, and epistemology and to integrate these various domains into a 
holistic vision. The paper also stresses, however, the provisionality and partiality of that 
cosmic whole and considers the alternative visions of reality it precludes, the disorderly order 
that Heraclitus characterized as ‘the sweeping of random things scattered’ and that James 
Joyce terms ‘chaosmos’. 
   
3. AN HISTORICAL NOTE ON KΟΣΜΟΣ-TERMINOLOGY 
 
The title and topic of the first chapter notwithstanding, the reader might wish to know 
when Ancient Greek κόσμος was translated into English – in the notion of the ‘cosmos’. This 
44 
 
presents an opportunity to reflect upon the life of this concept in the English-speaking world. 
The word κόσμος is anglicised for the first time in Middle English in a twelfth century poem 
called the Ormulum, composed by a monk named Orm (or Orrm), and dedicated to biblical 
exegesis.42 There, in a commentary on the Gospel of John 3:16 (in the vulgate translation into 
Latin, Sic Deus dilexit mundum, et filium suum unigenitum daret)43, we read: 
& forr þatt manness sawle iss her 
Wel þurrh þe werelld tacnedd, 
Forr baþe fallenn inntill an 
Affterr Grickisshe spæche, 
Forr werelld iss nemmnedd Cossmós, 
Swa summ þe Grickess kiþenn, 
Forr þatt itt iss wurrþlike shridd 
Wiþþ sunne & mone & sterrness, 
Onn heffness whel all ummbetrin, 
Þurrh Godd tatt swillc itt wrohhte. 
 
(Ormulum, 17,555-64) 
Reconstruction of the poem’s contents is challenging, even for medievalists, but we can infer 
from the previous lines that the account here deals with the body and soul of man, both of 
which ‘fallenn intill an’ (‘fall into one’). Orm explains that the ‘werelld’ (‘world’) is called 
‘Cossmós’ in the Greek language by ‘summ Grickess’ (‘certain Greeks’), and he provides a 
                                                          
42 The Ormulum, with the notes and glossary of R.M. White, ed. R. Holt. Two Volumes (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1878). On the reception of the Greek concept κόσμος in English prior to 1850, also see Algeo 1998: 65. I 
thank Corinne Saunders and Helen Foxhall-Forbes for guidance with this text. 
43 The original Greek text reads: οὕτως γὰρ ἠγάπησεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν κόσμον, ὥστε τὸν υἱὸν τὸν μονογενῆ ἔδωκεν... 
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description of the firmament as ‘wurrþlike shridd / Wiþþ sunne & mone & sterrness’ (‘richly 
arrayed with sun, moon, and stars’) like a ‘whel all ummbetrin’ (‘wheel all round’). The 
author of the Ormulum apparently knew that mundus was the Latin term for Greek κόσμος, 
and Greek ‘Cossmós’ is taken to refer to English ‘werelld’ for the first time, although a lack 
of evidence showing similar adoptions from roughly 1200 – 1650 CE would be thought to 
indicate that Orm’s coinage, as remarkable as it is, did not take hold.44   
 The term κόσμος once again makes its way into the English language in the 
seventeenth century, when it is transliterated from Ancient Greek into English via a 
Latinisation to ‘Cosmus’.  This occurs in John Bulwer’s Anthropometamorphosis: Man 
Transform’d; or the Artificiall Changeling (first edition 1650; second edition 1653; third 
edition 1654), a curious work that blends medical observations, especially the physiognomy 
of the face, with cultural anthropology:45    
That as the greater world is called Cosmus, from the beauty thereof the inequality 
of the Centre thereof contributing much to the beauty and delightsomenesse of it: 
so in this Map or little world of beauty in the face, the inequality affords the 
prospect and delight. 
 
(Bulwer 1653: 242) 
Bulwer expressly employs an argument by analogy: just as the asymmetry of the Cosmus is 
indicative of its beauty, so too the minor imperfections of the human face afford pleasure and 
                                                          
44 Orm refers to ‘Cossmós’ twice (at lines 17,559 and 17,592), and even, in relation to this, to the 
‘Mycrocossmós’, the human being, which, as Orm explains, ‘þatt nemmnedd iss / Affterr Ennglisshe spæche / 
Þe little werelld’ (ll. 17,593-17,597). 
45 Bulwer, a physician and author of five works that dealt with subjects like hand gesturing among the deaf, non-
verbal facial communication, and comparative cultural anthropology, is comparatively poorly studied.   
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joy. As interesting as these texts are, neither Orm’s appeal to the Cossmós nor Bulwer’s 
employment of Cosmus would not have any traceable lasting effect on the English language.   
Quite by the way, the transliteration of κόσμος most commonly recognized today, as 
‘cosmos’, was popularised through two English translations of Alexander von Humboldt’s 
influential five-volume work Kosmos: Entwurf einer physischen Weltbeschreibung (Vol. 1 
published in German in 1845). The first translation of this work into English, in 1845, by A. 
Prichard and published by Hippolyte Baillière Publisher in London, was superseded by the 
authoritative version published in 1849 by Henry G. Bohn in London, and translated by E. C. 
Otté. Both versions of Humboldt’s compendium of natural philosophy anglicised kosmos to 
‘cosmos’, effectively creating the expression of a concept that would have a lasting legacy in 
the English-speaking world. With the Greek notion of the κόσμος, Humboldt found the 
concept he needed for his unique systematic contribution to the history of natural science: 
By uniting, under one point of view, both the phenomena of our own globe and 
those presented in the regions of space, we embrace the limits of the science of 
the Cosmos46, and convert the physical history of the globe into the physical 
history of the universe; the one term being modelled upon that of the other. The 
science of the Cosmos is not, however, to be regarded as a mere encyclopaedic 
aggregation of the most important and general results that have been collected 
together from special branches of knowledge…In the work before us, partial facts 
will be considered only in relation to the whole. The higher the point of view the 
greater the necessity for a systematic mode of treating the subject in language at 
once animated and picturesque. 
 
                                                          
46 Italics original. 
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(Humboldt 1849: 36, tr. Otté) 
Humboldt, who is to be considered responsible for the modern conceptualisation and 
terminology of ‘cosmos’, constructed his own theory of nature in reference to ancient 
philosophers, and especially to the Pythagorean Philolaus of Croton (DK 44), by building 
upon philological work done especially by August Boeckh in his 1819 edition of Philolaus’ 
fragments.47 In a representatively eclectic footnote, Humboldt traced the history of the trio of 
concepts indicated by Greek κόσμος – Latin mundus – German welt back to Homer and 
worked through the evidence from Plutarch, Aristotle, the Pseudo-Aristotelian On the 
Kosmos, Ennius, Cicero, Greek inscriptions in the Roman Empire, and Hesychius.48 The 
notion of ‘cosmos’ remained present in the popular imagination from Humboldt forward, but 
it was significantly re-popularised with the 1978–9 television documentary Carl Sagan’s 
Cosmos, co-produced by the PBS affiliate KCET in Los Angeles and the BBC in the UK – 
where the editor of this volume first encountered this concept. It has remained a formative 
notion for his entire life.  Hence, this volume is entitled Cosmos in the Ancient World – a nod 
to Humboldt’s and Sagan’s inspiration for conceptualising systems of order in the universe, 
but also to the first appearance of this word in English, as Cossmós, in Orm’s elegant twelfth-
century commentary on the verses of the Gospel of John. 
For the purposes of consistency, this volume employs a strict transliteration, rather than 
a Latinisation, of κόσμος and related words to kosmos (e.g. kosmoi, kosmioi, diakosmos, 
diakosmêsis). This also follows for all Greek terms when they are transliterated (e.g. 
koinônia), although in the case of proper names this volume will employ the Latinised form 
(e.g. Empedocles of Agrigentum, rather than Empedoklês of Akragas). It will regularly refer 
to what in English is commonly understood to be ‘the cosmos’ with ‘the kosmos’, as 
                                                          
47 Boeckh 1819. 
48 Humboldt 1849: 51-3. 
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differentiated from the more general conceptualization of order or arrangement implied by 
the simple term ‘kosmos.’ 
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Et cum tempus advenerit, quo se mundus renovaturus extinguat, viribus ista se 
caedent et sidera sideribus incurrent et omni flagrente materia uno igni quicquid 
nunc ex dispositio lucet ardebit. Nos quoque felices animae et aeterna sortitae, 
cum deo visum erit iterum ista moliri, labentibus cunctis et ipsae parva ruinae 
ingentis accessio in antiqua elementa vertemur. 
 
(Seneca, To Marcia, On Consolation 26.6-7) 
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